Category Archives: Europe

Europe’s place in the multipolar world

Introduction: The Lesson of the G7 train wreck

 It’s official. After the calamitous G7 summit meeting in Canada, it is clear that an unbound Donald Trump is Europe’s worst nightmare. Although with typical unnecessary narcissism he came late and left early, what Donald Trump did in his few short hours on Canadian soil will be commented on for years, as he emerged as a virtual caricature of everything Europeans hate about Americans.

Preternaturally over-confident and under-prepared, arrogant, and self-regarding, the president urged Russia be readmitted to the G7 club (despite its iron-clad control of Crimea and ruination of eastern Ukraine), doubled down on enraging European and Canadian allies alike over the brewing trade war (‘America is not a piggy bank’), and generally confirmed everyone’s worst fears that the White House actually prefers dealing with America’s authoritarian foes, such as China’s Xi Jinping, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, rather than the vexing, well-meaning, but weak democratic pygmies who populate the standard multilateral meeting. Surely, after such an odious display the rest of the democratic world must rise up in righteous indignation and……

Well, the best I can come up with is snub Trump administration appointments at formal cocktail parties. For the bleak truth lying behind Donald Trump’s appalling, wrong-headed policies and behaviour in Canada is that the rest of the democratic world is pathetically weak and bereft of agency. As such, while they seethe with disgust at having to put up with the odious president, there is nothing practically they are prepared to do to stop him. This most transactional of presidents has inadvertently but graphically illustrated how practically irrelevant America’s western allies, particularly in Europe, truly are.

Be careful what you wish for

This is all so different from the dreams of a new multipolar world that so animated European thinkers during the long days of the bipolar Cold War. Then, European policy intellectuals—particularly in France—dreamed of living in a multipolar age that would follow victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War, a time when Europe would finally achieve the strategic flexibility to have its own independent foreign and security policy, no longer shackled to (but still vaguely allied with) the US. But this long-term strategic goal amounted to little more than emotional wish-fulfilment, predicated as it was on two unremarked upon suppositions.

The first was that the relative diminution in American global power would be meekly accepted by a US long used to running things. In other words, a series of President Obamas would shepherd the US to accept its new central, but relatively more limited, structural position in the multipolar world. To put it mildly, a President Trump—whose very campaign slogan ‘Make America Great Again’ is an overly emotional refutation of America’s relative decline—was not reckoned on.

Second, it was blithely assumed by European thinkers that their continent would undoubtedly and effortlessly emerge as the principal new force in this new world of many powers. As China rose during the latter days of the Cold War, following Deng Xiaoping’s historic opening in December 1978, European thinkers did foresee a world where a rising Asia would join America, Europe, Japan, and a diminished Russia as the main players on the global strategic scene (India was little thought of). But the notion that Europe would be by a long way the weakest of these great powers—politically divided, economically sclerotic, and militarily puny—never entered their thoughts.

As a result, while European thinkers seemed to pine for a multipolar world, in reality it was a new era where their continent was rising–as America was falling and the Soviets were non-existent–that was their real dream. Donald Trump’s petulant performance (and Europe’s anaemic non-response) at the just concluded G7 meeting glaringly illustrates that today’s world is simply not the sort of multipolarity European thinkers ever had in mind.

What Europe Should Do

 Most foreign policy articles (and I have written over 500 of them) are cries in the wilderness, futile exercises where the analyst proposes outcomes that they know will never come to pass. Nevertheless, it remains the duty of every political risk analyst to try, to posit what can be practically done to retrieve strategic situations, for irretrievable decline is a choice and not a preordained destiny.

In this spirit, what can Europe do to make itself relevant as a Great Power in the real multipolar era we actually now live in? First, psychologically accept that while Trump is an extreme case, American leaders in general are transactional in nature; they will only take European concerns on board if it is viewed as a serious power capable of going its own way in terms of genuine practical policy consequences. Global politics is not a debating society; what matters are the views of the great strategic players, and the power they bring to bear—political, economic, strategic, diplomatic, and social—to further their interests. Europe must stop passively watching the world, and either master history, or history will surely master it.

Second, the Europeans have to act in a far more unitary manner in terms of foreign and security policy. Russia, an economic basket case in comparison (its economy is smaller than that of Italy), is the relevant comparison. For all that it is a corrupt, demographically decaying one-trick economic pony, a decrepit gas station utterly dependent on the spot price of oil and natural gas, Moscow punches far above its actual weight on the global scene.

The reason? President Putin can make decisive, unitary, foreign policy decisions for his country that are quickly acted on. Russia—as the Crimea episode illustrated—is still prepared to spend blood and treasure, to make real sacrifices to further the country’s foreign policy goals and interests. At present, I am not sure many in Brussels would be prepared to sacrifice a week’s holiday to do much of anything. For once and for all, Europe and its leaders have to decide if their foreign policy amounts to merely virtue signalling, or whether they are prepared to make the sacrifices to actually matter in the world.

To do so, an inner core of the key western European states—Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands—must move ahead, and actually begin to craft such a common foreign policy. Failure to do so will inevitably lead the other great powers to cherry pick Europe, to keep dividing the place precisely because it is inherently divided. It is not the fault of the outside powers, as states since time immemorial have taken advantage of their rival’s weaknesses. Rather it is the fault of a Europe that simply can’t get its act together.

Finally, as the mediocre age of Merkel subsides, endemic problems must be solved, rather than merely managed. Across the continent, Europe must free up its animal spirits and find a way to increase average growth rates to around two percent, if horrendous rates of youth unemployment and endemic economic torpor are to be righted. President Macron’s courageous and largely successful labour market reforms are a start, by more needs to be done.

With France as a nucleus, and after decades of torturous (and maddening) inaction, the major European countries must commit themselves to some level of serious defence spending, as without an army their moralistic lectures are just that, and nothing more. Finally, and again Macron is onto something here, ‘A Certain Idea of Europe,’ the idea of a strong, distinct, unique and blessed Europe, a sacred place whose interests and values are worth fighting for on the global stage, must be advanced as a unifying clarion call to action.

It is not too late for Europe to emerge as its thinkers once dreamed it would, and Trump’s odious behaviour in Canada surely serves as a call to arms. But it is one minute to the midnight of Europe’s strategic irrelevance.

Published by Princeton University Press, June 15, 2018.

–Dr. John C. Hulsman is President and Managing Partner of John C. Hulsman Enterprises, a prominent global political-risk consulting firm. His new book, To Dare More Boldly: The Audacious Story of Political Risk, was published by Princeton University Press in April and is available on Amazon. He lives in Milan, Italy.

 

 

 

 

        

 

In a trade War, Europe Can Deal a Historic Blow to the US

By Dr John Hulsman and Dr Boris N.Liedtke

“This is so dumb. Europe, Canada, and Mexico are not China, and you don’t treat allies the same way as opponents.”

–Senator Ben Sasse, Republican from Nebraska, regarding President Trump’s Trade strategy

 The vast majority of economic theorists would agree that in a trade war the economies as a whole in all the countries involved lose out. Their conclusion is, despite sunny and fantastical claims by the Trump White House to the contrary, that a trade war is not winnable. But this should only be where discussion on the administration’s bellicose trade policy towards its allies—the EU, Canada, and Mexico—begins, not ends.

For the key is to think broader than the trade relationship between two countries. The Trump administration, in its gormless overconfidence, has just handed a potential historic victory to its allies in Europe and Canada – as long as these countries are willing to accept the new reality of a Trump presidency, the multipolar world we now live in, and boldly go where they did not dare go before.

Donald Trump’s negotiation style has been highly predictable and consistent throughout his business career as well as since assuming the presidency. It can be summarised by two main pillars which are common knowledge among professional negotiators: first adopt an early anchor strategy, and second know and exploit the counterparty’s BRA (Best Realistic Alternative). The former simply means to be the first in a negotiation to claim a position highly favourable to yourself, thereby forcing the other party to start negotiating away from their core position.

The second negotiating gambit is to analyse what the counterparty’s best realistic alternative is if a deal is not struck. Once this is known, you are then willing to marginally move from the anchor towards inside a settlement area that is better for the counterparty than no deal at all. The only way to counter this strategy is by walking temporarily away from the offered deal, find a better realistic alternative or improve on one’s position. When that is done, the trick is to re-engage with the other party by throwing out your own anchor.

Moving from theory to reality, Trump has just thrown out his anchor in trade negotiations with Canada, Europe and Mexico by unilaterally imposing tariffs on steel and aluminium. The knee jerk reaction of these countries is to counter this with their own punitive tariffs and then seek negotiations hoping to settle somewhere within their best realistic alternative, but probably relatively close to what the Trump administration will be hoping for. Consumers in both countries will face higher prices; jobs on both sides of the Atlantic will be lost and economic theorists will be proven right – no one wins a trade war.

But this unimaginative policy would also mean missing a historic opportunity which the US has just blindly, foolishly, handed to Europe. If the European countries and the EU have the imagination and the will to see President Trump’s unforced error, they can seize on his glaring mistake as a game changer in global politics itself, or at least at a minimum as a substantially improved Best Realistic Alternative in future talks with the US.

In 1823, then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams formulated the Monroe Doctrine, which has been the bedrock of US foreign policy ever since. In essence, it claims that “as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for colonization by any European powers.” America boldly declared that the Western Hemisphere was exclusively an American sphere of influence, and that European (and any other) powers were to be kept out.

Mexico and Canada, as America’s immediate neighbours, have benefitted from the Doctrine through improved national security and trade but have also seen their foreign policy options severely restricted. But the foundation for the continued relevance of the Doctrine have been rapidly corroding during the Tump presidency. The president has called into question both the military commitment it offers its allies and has now moved to challenge the economic benefits of free trade with its closest neighbours, who are amongst its most important trading partners. Institutionally, NATO has been questioned and NAFTA is outright being blown apart. Europe needs to react to these calamities and step out of the shadows of a regional power to assume its role as a global player.

And the time is ripe for the EU to pounce. Undoubtedly, Canada in many ways finds itself a ‘European’ country marooned on the North America continent, in terms of its cultural, political and economic mores. Among foreign policy circles it is frequently joked that Canada would feel more at home if it would be situated between Belgium and the Netherlands, yet geography has errantly placed it north of the United States.

While Canada can’t do much about its geography, President Trump has nevertheless opened the door for a bold strike to shift Canada back to the sphere of influence of Europe – reversing the Monroe doctrine. Instead of playing tit-for-tat on trade with a negotiator like Donald Trump, the European Union could change the game entirely, offering Canada the opportunity to apply for a fast track admission to the European trade block, joining as a full member at the earliest possible opportunity. Lost trade relationships between Canada and the USA would be quickly replaced with access to an even larger consumer market in Europe, and on far more common cultural trading terms. Geo-strategically, Europe, instead of losing global influence through Brexit, would gain a foothold on another continent.

Scepticism about Europe being capable of expanding to the Americas should be put to rest by looking at recent history. During the 1990s and 2000s, the European Union moved eastwards to include former Communist countries, which were and in some cases remain further removed Brussels than are the rule-of-law-loving Canadians.

The audacious invitation to Canada to apply for membership in the European Union—triggered by America’s feckless declaration of a trade war on its own allies–would inevitably trigger an anguished, overdue, and fundamental foreign policy discussion in Washington about what it would mean to have the European Union on its northern border. As NAFTA inevitably breaks up—due to a combination of the Trump administration’s unrealistic demands on Mexico, and its likely July election of leftist firebrand Andreas Manuel Lopez Obrador as president–it is conceivable that America’s southern neighbour might even seek to join this alliance over time. Geo-strategically, the world would be truly turned upside down, heralding the birth of the new multipolar era.

Even at a minimum, such an initiative would have substantially shifted the Best Realistic Alternative trade strategy in any future negotiations with the US. Instead of seeing themselves as vassal states depending on the US for its defence, foreign, and trade policy – Canada, Mexico and Europe–would sit down with the US as negotiating equals, letting Donald Trump know that the alternative to sensible trade positions between the allies of the Cold War is an absolutely ruinous policy of geopolitical isolation, with the US finding itself surrounded by the European Union on its own continent.

Donald Trump is succeeding in singlehandedly taking an axe to the old international order. However, with geopolitical creativity and will, a new and better one can still emerge from the ashes.

–Dr. John C. Hulsman is President and Managing Partner of John C. Hulsman Enterprises, a prominent global political-risk consulting firm. His new book, To Dare More Boldly: The Audacious Story of Political Risk, was published by Princeton University Press in April and is available on Amazon. He lives in Milan, Italy.

–Dr. Boris N. Liedtke is the Distinguished Executive Fellow at INSEAD Emerging Markets Institute and has over twenty years’ experience in the financial sector. He was the CEO of the largest bank by assets in Luxemburg and board member for Operations at the largest German fund manager. He is author of numerous articles on finance and trade as well as having received his PhD from the London School of Economics for the publication of “Embracing a Dictatorship” by MacMillan.

Published in the European Financial Review, June 6, 2018.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Promised Land Fallacy: Von Tirpitz Disastrously Builds a Navy

The Dangerous Mirage of the Promised Land Fallacy

Distantly related to the losing gambler’s syndrome is the promised land fallacy, the naïve view that one attribute of power or one strategy is sufficient to overcome the complexity of the world and—in silver bullet-like fashion—change the terms of the geopolitical game. In essence, it’s the very human effort to falsely manufacture a game-changing strategy rather than recognising that game-changing events generally happen organically.

Political risk analysts throughout the ages, frustrated by the constraints of living in the world as they have found it, are often highly susceptible to dreaming up analysis designed to liberate them from the shackles of reality. Ruinously, reality always wins.

In the years following the innovative genius of British Prime Minister Lord Robert Salisbury’s foreign policy, Anglo-German relations nevertheless spiralled out of control. No one was more responsible for this than Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, whose wrong-headed promised land strategy to supersede the British navy instead led Germany directly over the cliff into the charnel house of the Great War.

For Wilhelmine Germany, the building of a fleet from scratch to challenge the mighty Royal Navy was meant to be the country’s ticket to its place in the sun. The German political and military elite, frustrated that the world (especially haughty Great Britain) failed to recognise the ascension of Germany to Great Power status, set about rushing the forces of history, rather than merely waiting for their yearly relative gains in global power to become apparent over time. Already possessing the greatest army in the world, the Kaiser became intent on building a threatening navy.

Instead of heralding an era of German dominance, the elite in Berlin unwittingly started a process that led to its doom. The naval race awoke an alarmed London to the coming German threat to its position as the single greatest power in the world (though one in relative decline), a fact that helped directly lead to war and ruinous German defeat. Far from leading to the promised land, this approach puts political risk analysts forever at the mercy of the latest intellectual fad, often leading to simplistic analysis that doesn’t stand up to the realities of a complicated world.

Von Tirpitz Recklessly Challenges British Naval Dominance

 Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz became the living embodiment of the Kaiser’s drive to build a world-class navy, almost from scratch. Born March 19, 1849, pictures of von Tirpitz show a man looking like nothing so much as an enraged walrus, with his long, flowing beard, fierce eyes, and stern countenance.

Yet von Tirpitz was much more than this caricature of a stiff-necked Prussian. For one thing, he knew the English personally and well, spoke the language fluently, and even sent his two daughters to the prestigious Cheltenham Ladies’ College. For another, von Tirpitz rose through the German navy’s ranks largely through his own merits, something unheard of at the time. Tirpitz, for all the Prussian glowering, was essentially a creative, outward-looking, self-made man.

In 1897, von Tirpitz was made head of the powerful Imperial Navy Office, an unassailable bureaucratic perch that allowed him to relentlessly focus on making the German navy a force to be reckoned with; he was to remain central to German naval thinking until 1916. His primary strategic recommendation was that Germany must build as many battleships as possible and challenge British naval hegemony. Initially, von Tirpitz advocated the creation of two squadrons of eight battleships, plus a fleet flagship and two reserves.

Between 1898 and 1912, von Tirpitz managed to get four naval acts through the German Parliament, greatly expanding the size of the country’s High Seas Fleet. Over time, his clearly stated strategic goal became to construct a navy that two-thirds of the size of the dominant British Fleet. In the narrowest of terms, von Tirpitz was successful, in that he took the very meagre German navy he had inherited in the 1890s and transformed it into a world-class force.

The Germans miscalculate

The irony was that, for both von Tirpitz and the Kaiser, the German naval build-up was essentially defensive in nature. They did not wish to overwhelm Britain as a revolutionary power, but merely to be taken seriously by it as a valued guarantor of the status quo. The von Tirpitz strategic plan was to build the world’s second-largest navy after Britain’s, announcing Germany’s arrival on the world stage as an undisputed great power.

In this vision, the naval build-up would get the Germans to the promised land, making the British see sense and accommodate Germany’s rise to great power status. Yet, as so often has proven the case for those whose political risk analysis leads them to adopt the promised land strategy, unintended consequences overwhelmed these initial goals.

In direct reaction to von Tirpitz’s naval programme, Britain (between 1902-1910) embarked on its own massive naval build-up, with the express purpose of safeguarding its naval dominance and seeing off the perceived German strategic threat. As such, von Tirpitz’s build-up, far from cowing Britain into supporting Germany’s overall strategic rise, instead came to be seen as a mortal threat in London.

Conclusion: The promised land strategy and unintended consequences

 The unintended result of the von Tirpitz plan was to leave Germany in the worst of all possible strategic worlds. Its efforts to catch up with the dominant British navy narrowed, but did not eliminate, Britain’s maritime advantage. In an immediate, limited sense, the Germans won the naval arms race by whittling down British dominance. But the cost of this pyrrhic victory was exorbitant.

For the change in strategic circumstances was enough to alarm Britain into fundamentally changing its foreign and strategic policies, but did not alter the overriding fact that in 1914 it still possessed by a long way the most powerful naval force in the world. It was the naval arms race that persuaded Britain to wholly adopt Lord Salisbury’s evolving policy and instead look for allies to deal with what was seen—as the result of the von Tirpitz plan—as an increasingly malevolent German threat.

Unwittingly the promised land fallacy unleashed by von Tirpitz directly led to the closer Anglo-French ties that were to form the basis of the resistance to Germany in World War I. With Britain pressed to withdraw its Mediterranean fleet to its home waters to fend off the impending German naval threat, much closer ties with Paris became an absolute strategic imperative so as to safeguard (through the French navy taking London’s place in the Mediterranean) the Suez Canal, the jugular of the British Empire.

Britain, turning its back decisively on its nineteenth-century post-Napoleonic foreign policy heritage, formally allied itself with European powers France in 1904, and Russia, in 1907. Incredibly, the Germans—in pursuing their promised land strategy to secure in von Tirpitz’s words German ‘political independence’ from England—had instead forced the British into their eternal enemy France’s waiting arms, the worst possible strategic thing Berlin could have done. World War I was not far away.

Published by Princeton University Press, April 17, 2018. 

Dr. John C. Hulsman is the President and Co-Founder of John C. Hulsman Enterprises (www.john-hulsman.com), a prominent global political risk consulting firm. For three years, Hulsman was the Senior Columnist for City AM, the newspaper of the city of London. Hulsman is a Life Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The author of all or part of 14 books, Hulsman has given over 1520 interviews, written over 650 articles, prepared over 1290 briefings, and delivered more than 510 speeches on foreign policy around the world. His most recent work, To Dare More Boldly; The Audacious Story of Political Risk, has just been published by Princeton University Press in April 2018 and is available for order on Amazon.