The Return of the Feudal World?

In today’s post-industrial economy, it is evident that world politics is under radical restructuring. More precisely, as the authors argue, the model of nation-state has come under attack from below – in the form of a deteriorating level of trust by the people towards their elected or unelected representatives – as well as from above, by failing to provide appropriate answers to an ever more globalised world. With the nation-states’ apparent inability to withstand 21st century challenges, how then can our modern world move forward?

“The life of the nation is secure only when the nation is honest, truthful, and virtuous.” – Frederick Douglass, Speech given on the 23rd anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation, 1885

In the spirit of the words of the great American abolitionist, we aim to be ruthlessly honest and truthful, even if this journey leads us directly to the great conundrum of our multipolar age: The nation-state simply isn’t working very well anymore — especially in terms of delivering effective policy governance, even as its staying power seems beyond dispute.

It is this paradox that explains much of what ails our present world, why “nothing seems to be working”. And indeed, the present record of the nation-state, undoubtedly the dominant present vehicle for global governance, seems to have missed the mark at every turn. Recently, there has been a collapse of nation-states in the developing world, creating governance black holes that have led to catastrophe in places like Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC).

These nation-states have failed in their basic function of being able to keep internal order, largely because politically their governance structures are not a representation of the political realities on the ground in each country, meaning they have come to be little more than geographical expressions, not nation-states imbued with the political power to effectively promote internal stability.

However, it is also in the supposedly well-governed developed world that the nation-state has showed its recent glaring inadequacies. Be it the Lehman Brothers Crisis (which unleashed the global Great Recession), the endless, endemic euro crisis of the European Mediterranean countries, or the calamity of America’s adventurism in Iraq – replete with botched intelligence and botched post-war planning – the nation-state seems to be showing its age, not delivering on its grandiose claims to facilitate both global governance and political and economic stability for its people.

We shall argue that the model of the nation-state has come under attack from below – in the form of a deteriorating level of trust by the people towards their elected or unelected representatives – as well as from above, by failing to provide appropriate answers to an ever more globalised world.

But if the nation-state does seem to have flatly failed lately at every turn, nor is it about to be replaced. Contrary to the fevered imaginings of European Federalists, the nation-state cannot simply be wished away as an annoying anachronism of a bygone age.

Rather, the dirty little secret at the heart of our new era is that all the rising powers — be they China, India, South Africa, Indonesia, or Brazil — are more sovereigntist, more nationalistic, more wedded to jealously preserving their national prerogatives than is even the United States, long the bane of post-national dreamers. Instead, it is the supposedly modern, post-nationalist European experiment that seems to be in terminal decline. Both intellectual defenders of the nation- state and its critics seem to be largely wrong at present. For as of now, we live in a bewildering world, where the nation-state is both not working very well and isn’t about to be replaced.

The Thirty Years’ War and the Crucible of the Peace of Westphalia

Historians and Political Scientists have long agreed that the Thirty Year’s war – ending in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia – was the pivotal moment when the modern nation-state was born. The religious struggles of the previous 100 years or so – following the Reformation – were largely fuelled by the attempt of feudal Catholic Europe, with its religious world view, to adapt to the multiple challenges posed by the Renaissance.

The concept that “Man is the Measure of all things” was new, revolutionary thinking that manifested itself in the arts, politics, science and education. Despite attempts by the church and the political elite to retain its dominance in the feudal religious world through force, violence, and reconciliation culminating in the charnel house of the Thirty Years’ War – the end result was instead a new world order whereby human international interactions became governed no longer by the Church but increasingly by the Nation-State.

Before this development, the Western feudal world lacked the technology, communications, and structure to allow the implementation and projection of power and state control much beyond the immediate reach of the local nobleman, i.e a day’s travel on a horse was the limit for effective “state” control.

The population lived locally with the church being the only supra-national institution to deal with the few supra-national topics of its age. Yet the Renaissance and the resulting advances in technology and organisations allowed for state control to be expanded far beyond a day’s travel. Times had changed and the old structure of the Western world had come under pressure.

This dramatic change evolved out of the desperate attempt of the Peace of Westphalia to see to it that nothing like the Thirty Years’ War was ever to happen again. It is hard to adequately describe what a calamity the war was for the people of Central Europe, and especially Germans nestled in the Holy Roman Empire. It amounts to one of the bloodiest conflicts in all of human history, with an estimated eight million casualties of its ceaseless slaughter.

Overall, depletion of the local German populations typically ranged from a decrease of 25–40%, underscoring what a staggering calamity the war amounted to. Given the many great powers that joined the fray as the war proceeded (Sweden, Spain, France, Austria), in many ways the Thirty Years’ War amounts to the first true world war of the modern era. And just as was true following the carnage in 1918 and 1945, in 1648 diplomats assembled, determined to prevent such a disaster from happening again.

The war’s genesis began as the staunchly Catholic Ferdinand II, the newly crowned Holy Roman Emperor, tried to impose Catholic conformity on his largely Protestant northern German princes, who had long enjoyed the freedom to govern their own territories based on their different religious views. This attempt to re-assert religious conformity was ultimately quashed.

The Peace of Westphalia recognised this cardinal error. It changed the basic relationship between rulers and subjects. Up until now in the feudal world, people tended to have overlapping (and often competing) political and religious allegiances and loyalties.

The basic European feudal structure saw supra- national problems dominated by (and managed by) the Church. Its other salient feature was the great relative power of local princes, who in this fragmented age were largely left to their own devices by any nominal king above them. Think of the powerful, largely autonomous Dukes of Normandy (such as William the Conqueror) and their relationship with their only nominal overlords, the Kings of France, and you will get the point.

However, changes in technology and human philosophy made the alterations to the nation- state system in the Western world not only possible, but necessary. After the acceptance of Westphalia, this system dramatically changed, as far more local uniformity (compared to any over-arching power in Rome) became the norm, as the local princes decided on the religious and political tenor of those they governed. Protestant princes in the Holy Roman Empire came over time to exercise primary control over their charges, and to set the religious and political tone for their fiefdoms (not the Holy Roman Emperor).

If the Princes were Protestant, their states were thought by all to be so as well (and vice versa for Catholics). Other Catholic and Protestant princes never again to such a large extent attempted to interfere with the domestic internal workings of another state, in an effort to avoid a further cataclysmic war; the concept of state sovereignty had been born. Allegiances in the Holy Roman Empire were no longer decided by a mix of the supra-national centre in Rome, and by the many local German traditions of the empire either, as had been the case up until 1618.

Instead, while there was less uniformity at the supranational level, as the success of Protestantism led to the diminution in the power of the Vatican, there was far more uniformity at the local level. Nationalism emerged with the victory of the regional princes, just as supranationalism and localism waned. Our modern state system had been born, with the nation-state in the driver’s seat.

Countries and the relationship among them governed the world in the next 350 years. The world started to increasingly function along national borders with national taxes, national laws, national conscriptions, national education, languages following along largely national geographies, national governments, national elections, and national representations in multi-national organisations. Colonisation and imperialism ensured that by the early 19th century pretty much every inhabitable spot on the Earth and every human being belonged to a nation and frequently identified with it.

People were born with a national passport, attended national education that formed their opinion, engaged in national military service where they fought other nations, attended nationally-funded Universities, paid nationally-imposed taxes and adhered to national laws until they passed away. Even in death, the nation-state was inescapable through the national process of death certification and taxes.

The institution of the nation-state served humanity well throughout these 350 years. The increasing living expectancy, the possibility by billions to enjoy leisure time instead of fear (due to increasing internal domestic political stability), the economic and population growth, the advancement of knowledge and science, and the incredible output of old and new forms of art all make a testimony to the strength of the world order birthed at Westphalia. Life was certainly no longer “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish or short”.

At the end of this period, following the triumph of nationalist America over the supranational Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), there was such confidence in the nation-state that it inspired utopian-based thinking that humanity might have reached the end of history – “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

The nation-state’s zenith has passed

However, mankind’s political, scientific or technological progress “operates on the principle of escalation. Technology solves problems but it also gives rise to new ones. The more technology we have at our disposal, the more technology we need to deal with the consequences. We invent ever more sophisticated techniques of food production, only to follow up with ways to contain overpopulation… Just as one can plot man’s scientific evolution as linear progress, one can explain it as a series of emergency measures to deal with the disastrous consequences of the previous big invention.”

The same thought applied here to science and technology can and should be applied more broadly. The success of the nation-state has given rise to new challenges for which the nation-state structure can no longer provide acceptable answers. As a result, we must conclude that “Modern history condemns us to a permanent rat race against the consequences of our own creativity. We progress but only toward an ever-larger need for progress. To stop that progress is ultimately to doom humanity.”

The thought, which the architect Reinier de Graaf so eloquently applied to technology, must equally apply to the international political sciences that govern our world order. The nation- state solved many problems that the old world order was incapable of dealing with — following the Thirty Years’ War there was never again a major religious war in Europe — but in doing so created new ones.

The success of the nation-state has inevitably led to supranational problems, which it is simply not very well equipped to solve. National conflicts that have become global world wars need to be governed by international alliances. Commerce creating incredible wealth for nations encompassing the entire globe have to be dealt with through trade agreements and world organisations composed by nations.

Unprecedented travel and migration have to be governed by international civil conventions and universal declarations made by nations. National economies allowing mass consumption is causing industrial pollution that threatens our global environment which in turn have to be dealt with through climate agreements negotiated and signed by representatives of nations. However, these global solutions based on nations’ interactions are increasingly hijacked by more myopic national state self-interests, thus failing to provide long-term sustainable solutions.

Challenges to the nation-state then, largely emanate from its own historical success. Advances in technology, made possible often by the nation-state itself, through the 20th century and into our present day through radio, television and later computer technology – and in particular the internet – has brought an unparalleled transparency.

For our discussion, the most important implications of this transparency are twofold. Firstly, transparency has made it clear to all the differing living standards of the world. Secondly, the human fallibility and foibles of our elected or unelected political elite are on display as never before.

The former has had and will continue to have wide ranging global implications. Specifically, this has already contributed to West’s victory in the Cold War (no one wanted to live in East Germany as opposed to Swinging London) three decades ago and is certainly a big factor behind the present immigration pressure which the U.S.A. as well as Europe and parts of Asia are experiencing. It is unsurprising that a newly-awakened rest of the world wants to personally share in the paradise that is the successful developed world.

The fact that people in Syria, Mexico, parts of China, and the rest of the underdeveloped world can obtain a direct glimpse of the consumer boom of the Western world or coastal China via the small screens of their internet-connected phones or simply via TV is no longer unknowable. Pandora’s box is open – for good and bad – and people in economically-challenged regions are longing to reach the Nirvana they observe on their little screens.

Modern transportation technology has basically removed the “literal” barrier of entry that geography once posed. Planes, cars, ships, etc. have made it theoretically affordable for even the poorest human being to emigrate. It is only the administrative, physical, and commercial barriers erected by the nation-state – frequently using geography in its defence (desert between Mexico and U.S.A.; the Mediterranean Sea between Europe and Africa) – that holds back this form of globalised immigration. Yet there is no solution or end in sight of the people from poor regions desiring a better life through immigration.

So the nation-state’s erected barriers will continue to come under real and philosophical pressure. The question has to be asked: “What right does one human or society have to block and hinder the free and peaceful movement of another through this world?” There only is an affirmative answer given the existence of the nation-state, which somehow has established this right through the creation of artificial borders based on historical events. Remove the nation-state from the equation and the answer becomes simple – “None”.

However, the transparency provided by technology has had equally far-reaching implications in the developed world going far deeper than just an issue of foreign immigration. With the use of radio by the political elite – politics became more accessible to the masses. The 1908 U.S. presidential race between Republican William Howard Taft and Democrat William Jennings Bryan marked the first time that recorded speeches were used to expand the speaker’s audience to those not in attendance. Woodrow Wilson was the first president who felt compelled to hold a presidential press conference in 1913.

President Warren Harding followed, becoming the first president to deliver a speech broad- cast by radio. FDR perfected the use of this medium during his 30 evening radio addresses between 1933 and 1944 which became know as the Fireside Chats, a great political achievement which welded the American people to his reform programmes, come thick and thin. After the war, Harry Truman delivered the first oval office TV address and President Eisenhower used the same format to inform the people about his decision to send troops to enforce school desegregation.

In 1960, CBS organised the first TV presidential election debate, which many credited as a turning point in favour of the young dashing looking John Kennedy against a tired-looking make-up-less Richard Nixon. Finally, the entertainment value of the Trump period in the White House would certainly be substantially diminished without his many “tweets” to the masses, even though the information value might be suspect. Through voice, picture, and later internet, the nation-state’s representatives appeared ever more accessible to the U.S. electorate.

The U.S.A. is perhaps the most prominent user of this medium of enhanced political communication but other countries saw similar developments. The BBC and its founding father – John Reith – finally convinced King George V in 1932 regarding the necessity to hold a Christmas message via radio to his subjects around the world. The use of this technology was certainly not limited to liberal free societies and so one of the most influential film directors and producers of history – Leni Riefenstahl – perfected the use of the visual documentary in her masterpieces for the Nazis, Triumph of the Will and Olympia.

All this meant that the average person felt closer to their leaders of the nation-state than ever before. They started to see them – warts and all – as more and more human. Their mistakes and errors became known, documented and stored for future use. Leaders of nation-states became first fallible in the eyes of their electorate than increasingly ridiculed. In those countries where the media was less under the influence of the political elite, it soon developed into a hunt for human “gossip” and less a technology used for political debate.

The paparazzi were let loose on the political elite in the name of the fourth estate. As the available media outlets multiplied and polarised alongside the prevailing views of their specific audience, they started to loose their journalistic objectivity and were increasingly driven towards a short-term sensationalism. Youtube uploads and their followers became so numerous that many adjusted their content, based on the populism of “likes,” catering for specific desires and views. It was only a matter of “Google-ing” and “following” them, and everyone could find proof and arguments backing their own view about the leaders of the nation-state.

Preconceived ideas where strengthened and backed-up not by objectivity and researched facts but by selective sourcing of interpretation and subjectivity – the birth of “fake news”. In democracies, subjects increasingly found the “facts” they wanted and projected these onto their leaders, which in turn fed their image, which they felt provided the strongest backing to achieve electoral victory in the next contest.

The resulting cynicism between the leaders of the nation-state and the population was inevitable and is perhaps best summarised by a number of recent quotes from the leaders of the European people:

“When it becomes serious, you have to lie.” – on Greece’s economic melt- down, 2011

“If it’s a Yes, we will say ‘on we go’, and if it’s a No, we will say ‘we continue.’”–on the French referendum over EU constitution

“We all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-elected after we’ve done it.” – On Eurozone economic policy and democracy

However, with every lie, with every cynical comment, as well as with every sexual affair and continuous degrading attitude towards the female electorate (who comprise more than 50% of the voting population), the people increasingly rejected their political establishment. The unthinkable started to happen in democracies of the West. A sexual predator and real estate tycoon won the U.S. presidency with a slogan you can fit on a hat, “America First”. A lesbian, Investment Banker became the leader of the opposition in the German Bundestag, representing a party that opposes same-sex marriages and argues for the protection of the national rights of the working class along lines reminiscent of German politics of the 1930s. The entire French political elite and establishment – not just the presidency – was wiped out in just under two years by a young investment banker with virtually no public office experience.

The contradictions are glaring and only imaginable in a world where “fake news” has replaced basic objectivity. In an ever-fragmenting European political environment, Spain and Italy fail to deliver again and again through elections the political stability that the nation-state would need to tackle its global challenges. These political changes are cataclysmic. The temporary democratic victors of this disillusionment of the people in its political elite – the populists –have one thing in common – they are not politicians but political outsiders and feed on this image.

Perhaps driven by economic slowdown and certainly fired on by a sensational press, the people are fed up with their traditional political leaders. The more these outsiders discredit the political institutions of the nation-state through which they obtained power by comments and outrageous behaviour and claims – the more sensational they become for the press as a precious tool for higher publicity and internet “hits”. A self- feeding frenzy between new political elite, media and the people has been initiated and is starting to devour the structure of the very nation-state to which the necessity of a free press was so necessary in the past.

Let us dispel all delusional hope that this new non-political elite is somehow better equipped to deal with the challenges to the nation- state or – even less so – our global threats, than the previous established elite. It is preposterous to imagine that investment bankers, traders and real estate tycoons, all political novices, are better suited for solving our problems than anybody else. The most likely outcome – which we can also see on the historic horizon of the future – is an even broader disillusionment by the electorate, followed by an even more radical replacement of the old and new political elite. More sensationalism, more outrageous claims, and more radicalisation made acceptable by fake news will drive the nation-state into the abyss.

The success of the Nation-State destroys itself

In the seed of the success of the nation-state lies the severest challenge to the very institution itself. The success story of the nation-state was to create a globalised world in which pros- perity for many improved dramatically. However, from at least the middle of the 19th century, nations created issues and challenges for humanity, which are no longer national but global. A look at today’s world reflects this. Those risks to humanity that are hardest to solve are no longer national but require global responses. Military conflicts are no longer clear-cut wars between countries trying to eliminate the enemies’ national armed forces and occupying the enemies’ territory and capital. Military wherewithal in the shape of nuclear weapons is no longer just a threat to the local population in war zones but is a threat to the survival of humanity itself.

Pollution is no longer just threatening national rivers or forests but is causing weather patterns to change and water levels to rise impacting emerging market economies based in the Middle of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean as well as in the rest of the world. Religious differences are no longer just impacting the border between two countries but are engulfing the entire world in a struggle for a different Weltanschauung. Diseases are no longer a local or even a national or regional threat but via world travel have become a global concern.

Any look at the major headlines in the past few years confirms this. For all its power to win the war in Iraq against Saddam Hussein largely on its own, the U.S. (by far the strongest nation in the world) failed miserably to win the peace without local Iraqi buy-in. The Lehman Brothers crisis painfully illustrated that national regulators were not up to understanding the global implications of those they regulated. The U.S. Federal Reserve is constituted to deal with American (that is, national) inflation and unemployment rates, even as the dollar’s supranational dominance makes their decisions possess a truly and unthought-of global significance. Increasingly the nation-state is coming to its limit to find adequate responses to these global challenges.

In fact, the very foundation of national currencies and payment methods is being called into question by globalised capital markets which suddenly – through the use of new technology – experiment with global non-national currencies in the form of Bitcoin and other encrypted electronic decentralised currencies. The cycle is always the same – the nation-states’ success in creating global trade leads to global capital flows, which in turn is leading towards global currencies undermining the function of the nation- state and its central banks to issue, control and regulate its finances in its nation-state’s currency.

Humanity is facing increasingly global challenges for which the concept of the nation-state is ill equipped to provide solutions even via existing multi-national institutions. These challenges are as broad as religious confrontation, global terrorism, the increasing number of countries with the nuclear capability to destroy humanity, global pollution, international immigration, financial inequality in the West caused by an increasingly global labour market, and global health threats. While facing this challenge from above, the nation-state is equally being threatened from within or from below with a rejection by its people of its political ruling class.

The real problem

But while the nation-state is being challenged in supra- national policy terms by these global threats, as a result of the inability to address these challenges, the frustrated population of the the West has chosen to increasingly reject multi-national institutions (see Brexit) and to slowly turn towards nationalism as it feels it has lost democratic control of the decision-making process. It is the worst of all worlds; as problems become more transnational in nature, unelected, supranational institutions are increasingly reviled as anti-democratic, arrogant, and wildly unsuccessful.

It is this nexus that further explains the rise of populism throughout Europe on the left and right (Golden Dawn in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Five Star Movement in Italy, The Front National in France, UKIP in the UK, and the AfD in Germany). It would seem that what is needed is nothing less than a new world system, supplanting the failing Westphalian order, that combines political legitimacy at the national and local levels, with the ability to master the many supranational problems of today. Only a new global order – and a new ideology supporting it – can help us find solutions for global challenges. This global order cannot be based on the discredited nation-state institutions, which the very populations are rejecting so forcefully.

Back to the future — The new feudalism

Ironically, the model to solve the many problems evident at the dawn of today’s multipolar age – to master the increasing limitations of the nation-state that have been so glaringly exposed – is to go back to the future, to revisit the very feudal age that pre-dated Westphalia.

For what is called for is more coherent and effective supranational structures at the top, in line with the old primacy of the feudal church. For example, in this case a more effective G20 is necessary to deal with the many trans-national aspects of the global financial and economic systems. A global but decentralised currency regulated outside the sphere of any particular nation-state is needed.

In Asia, the United States is no longer a sufficient force (for all its power) to manage and hedge against the rise of China. Instead, increasing the role and power to influence nation-states through the Quadrilateral grouping of the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India makes a great deal more sense. A Europe with a Euro-zone finance minister and a mutualisation of common debt (from now on, though not for what has been run up before) would tackle the ongoing challenges to the financial stability of the people of the continent. European nation states need to agree to follow the same (rather stringent) fiscal policies to turn the euro-zone core into a true supranational community. The nation-state has to give up sovereignty to deal with the success it has created.

As this shopping list for increasingly effective supranational structures makes clear we are agnostic about the ways to achieve this; in some cases it will be inter-governmental (between nation-states), in others like the euro-zone, the supranational institutions will take on a life of their own. For challenges that threaten the very survival of humanity and human civilisation – such as nuclear war, the environment as well as certain economic and trade aspects – the only way forward is for nation-states to give up control and pass sovereignty over these issues to global institutions that function above and beyond the nation-state. But in any event, the goal is to pragmatically go back to the pre-Westphalian era, where more unified and effective supra-national institutions existed to mange trans-national problems.

At the same time, even in this more feudal world, the nation-state is not going anywhere; for many people cleave to it precisely because they still feel strong allegiances to their countries, and crucially feel they have some democratic and practical control over their outcomes. Nation- states will continue to have a dominant military role, play a major role in macro-economics, and be the dominant force securing their own internal security. But over time, the nation-state will do less, but by concentrating on these key functions, it will also do it better.

Crucially at the bottom of the global governance tree, localism — as was true during the feudal area — will also come into its own again. In line with Thomas Jefferson’s brilliant insight, problems should always be solved at the lowest possible level, precisely because it is closest to the people itself, and means the political and democratic legitimacy of policy solutions can be secured. As American Jeffersonians so well understood, by diffusing power you paradoxically can magnify it and guarantee its legitimacy.

So everything from education issues, to policing, to infrastructure, should be primarily managed at this local level. Further, as the feudal world well knew, it is here that people feel most connected to decision-makers; we may not personally know the president but we do know the Head of the School Board and can heap all sorts of direct social pressure on him if he sends the kids to school in a blizzard. This accountability, which is exactly what populists are rightly bemoaning, has been lost in the world of the nation-state. A feudal emphasis on localism can be the well-spring for a more legitimate, more broadly acceptable system of government.

There is little doubt that after over 360 years, the old Westphalian system, dominated by the nation- state, is beginning to show its age. The irony is that the true antidote to what ails it – going back to the future and resurrecting feudal elements of the pre-Westphalian world by buttressing both supranational and local responses to today’s problems – can be the very ancient answer that moves the modern world forward.

Published in The World Financial Review, July/August 2018 

Dr John C. Hulsman is President and Managing Partner of John C. Hulsman Enterprises, a prominent global political-risk consulting firm. His new book, To Dare More Boldly: The Audacious Story of Political Risk, was published by Princeton University Press in April and is available on Amazon. He lives in Milan, Italy.

Dr Boris N. Liedtke is the Distinguished Executive Fellow at INSEAD Emerging Markets Institute and has over twenty years experience in the financial sector. He was the CEO of the largest bank by assets in Luxemburg and board member for Operations at the largest German fund manager. He is author of numerous articles on finance and trade as well as having received his PhD from the London School of Economics for the publication of Embracing a Dictatorship by MacMillan.

Europe’s place in the multipolar world

Introduction: The Lesson of the G7 train wreck

 It’s official. After the calamitous G7 summit meeting in Canada, it is clear that an unbound Donald Trump is Europe’s worst nightmare. Although with typical unnecessary narcissism he came late and left early, what Donald Trump did in his few short hours on Canadian soil will be commented on for years, as he emerged as a virtual caricature of everything Europeans hate about Americans.

Preternaturally over-confident and under-prepared, arrogant, and self-regarding, the president urged Russia be readmitted to the G7 club (despite its iron-clad control of Crimea and ruination of eastern Ukraine), doubled down on enraging European and Canadian allies alike over the brewing trade war (‘America is not a piggy bank’), and generally confirmed everyone’s worst fears that the White House actually prefers dealing with America’s authoritarian foes, such as China’s Xi Jinping, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, rather than the vexing, well-meaning, but weak democratic pygmies who populate the standard multilateral meeting. Surely, after such an odious display the rest of the democratic world must rise up in righteous indignation and……

Well, the best I can come up with is snub Trump administration appointments at formal cocktail parties. For the bleak truth lying behind Donald Trump’s appalling, wrong-headed policies and behaviour in Canada is that the rest of the democratic world is pathetically weak and bereft of agency. As such, while they seethe with disgust at having to put up with the odious president, there is nothing practically they are prepared to do to stop him. This most transactional of presidents has inadvertently but graphically illustrated how practically irrelevant America’s western allies, particularly in Europe, truly are.

Be careful what you wish for

This is all so different from the dreams of a new multipolar world that so animated European thinkers during the long days of the bipolar Cold War. Then, European policy intellectuals—particularly in France—dreamed of living in a multipolar age that would follow victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War, a time when Europe would finally achieve the strategic flexibility to have its own independent foreign and security policy, no longer shackled to (but still vaguely allied with) the US. But this long-term strategic goal amounted to little more than emotional wish-fulfilment, predicated as it was on two unremarked upon suppositions.

The first was that the relative diminution in American global power would be meekly accepted by a US long used to running things. In other words, a series of President Obamas would shepherd the US to accept its new central, but relatively more limited, structural position in the multipolar world. To put it mildly, a President Trump—whose very campaign slogan ‘Make America Great Again’ is an overly emotional refutation of America’s relative decline—was not reckoned on.

Second, it was blithely assumed by European thinkers that their continent would undoubtedly and effortlessly emerge as the principal new force in this new world of many powers. As China rose during the latter days of the Cold War, following Deng Xiaoping’s historic opening in December 1978, European thinkers did foresee a world where a rising Asia would join America, Europe, Japan, and a diminished Russia as the main players on the global strategic scene (India was little thought of). But the notion that Europe would be by a long way the weakest of these great powers—politically divided, economically sclerotic, and militarily puny—never entered their thoughts.

As a result, while European thinkers seemed to pine for a multipolar world, in reality it was a new era where their continent was rising–as America was falling and the Soviets were non-existent–that was their real dream. Donald Trump’s petulant performance (and Europe’s anaemic non-response) at the just concluded G7 meeting glaringly illustrates that today’s world is simply not the sort of multipolarity European thinkers ever had in mind.

What Europe Should Do

 Most foreign policy articles (and I have written over 500 of them) are cries in the wilderness, futile exercises where the analyst proposes outcomes that they know will never come to pass. Nevertheless, it remains the duty of every political risk analyst to try, to posit what can be practically done to retrieve strategic situations, for irretrievable decline is a choice and not a preordained destiny.

In this spirit, what can Europe do to make itself relevant as a Great Power in the real multipolar era we actually now live in? First, psychologically accept that while Trump is an extreme case, American leaders in general are transactional in nature; they will only take European concerns on board if it is viewed as a serious power capable of going its own way in terms of genuine practical policy consequences. Global politics is not a debating society; what matters are the views of the great strategic players, and the power they bring to bear—political, economic, strategic, diplomatic, and social—to further their interests. Europe must stop passively watching the world, and either master history, or history will surely master it.

Second, the Europeans have to act in a far more unitary manner in terms of foreign and security policy. Russia, an economic basket case in comparison (its economy is smaller than that of Italy), is the relevant comparison. For all that it is a corrupt, demographically decaying one-trick economic pony, a decrepit gas station utterly dependent on the spot price of oil and natural gas, Moscow punches far above its actual weight on the global scene.

The reason? President Putin can make decisive, unitary, foreign policy decisions for his country that are quickly acted on. Russia—as the Crimea episode illustrated—is still prepared to spend blood and treasure, to make real sacrifices to further the country’s foreign policy goals and interests. At present, I am not sure many in Brussels would be prepared to sacrifice a week’s holiday to do much of anything. For once and for all, Europe and its leaders have to decide if their foreign policy amounts to merely virtue signalling, or whether they are prepared to make the sacrifices to actually matter in the world.

To do so, an inner core of the key western European states—Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands—must move ahead, and actually begin to craft such a common foreign policy. Failure to do so will inevitably lead the other great powers to cherry pick Europe, to keep dividing the place precisely because it is inherently divided. It is not the fault of the outside powers, as states since time immemorial have taken advantage of their rival’s weaknesses. Rather it is the fault of a Europe that simply can’t get its act together.

Finally, as the mediocre age of Merkel subsides, endemic problems must be solved, rather than merely managed. Across the continent, Europe must free up its animal spirits and find a way to increase average growth rates to around two percent, if horrendous rates of youth unemployment and endemic economic torpor are to be righted. President Macron’s courageous and largely successful labour market reforms are a start, by more needs to be done.

With France as a nucleus, and after decades of torturous (and maddening) inaction, the major European countries must commit themselves to some level of serious defence spending, as without an army their moralistic lectures are just that, and nothing more. Finally, and again Macron is onto something here, ‘A Certain Idea of Europe,’ the idea of a strong, distinct, unique and blessed Europe, a sacred place whose interests and values are worth fighting for on the global stage, must be advanced as a unifying clarion call to action.

It is not too late for Europe to emerge as its thinkers once dreamed it would, and Trump’s odious behaviour in Canada surely serves as a call to arms. But it is one minute to the midnight of Europe’s strategic irrelevance.

Published by Princeton University Press, June 15, 2018.

–Dr. John C. Hulsman is President and Managing Partner of John C. Hulsman Enterprises, a prominent global political-risk consulting firm. His new book, To Dare More Boldly: The Audacious Story of Political Risk, was published by Princeton University Press in April and is available on Amazon. He lives in Milan, Italy.