Category Archives: China and Asia Pivot

Knowing the Nature of the World You Live In: Or the Trials and Tribulations of George Harrison

One of the most vital political risk commandments to master is knowing the overall nature of the system you are evaluating in terms of its power distribution. For instance, are you assessing the unipolar Mediterranean Pax Romana of the Augustan age, the complex multipolarity of the post-Napoleonic European order painstakingly constructed Castlereagh and Metternich, or the bipolar Cold War world of the US and USSR? Only by knowing the nature of the world you live in—and its stability–can any policy or any analysis actually hope to be successful.

The best (and most entertaining) way to look at the change of power dynamics in a world order is to chronicle the startlingly quick unravelling of the greatest pop group in history. The Beatles went in lightning fashion from a period of artistic and commercial dominance in the mid-1960s (with Rubber Soul, Revolver, and Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band) to their demise in 1970 (following Let It Be and Abbey Road) in a blink of a historical eye. Why was this and what can the sad demise of the Fab Four tell us about global systems?

The Beatles’ System Falls Stunningly Apart

In the mid-1960s, the rather rigid structure lying behind the Beatles’ creative and commercial success—on most albums their lovable (and newly knighted) drummer Ringo Starr was given at most one song, George Harrison had at best two or three, with the rest being Lennon-McCartney originals—became the group’s unquestioned modus operandi. The system worked because it reflected the genuine creative power realities within the group at the time.

This pattern—the accepted rules underlying a bipolar world dominated by Lennon-McCartney—was followed with metronomic efficiency. On Rubber Soul, there are eleven Lennon-McCartney tunes, two penned by Harrison, and one by Ringo. Revolver is graced by eleven Lennon-McCartney songs, while Harrison had three and Ringo none. Sgt. Pepper’s in many ways amounts to the apogee of John and Paul’s creative dominance; fully twelve of the thirteen songs on this masterpiece were written by Lennon-McCartney, with George managing only one and Ringo none.

But by now George Harrison had had enough. In any other group he would have served as a first-rate front man, as both a performer and a writer; now he simply couldn’t get much of his increasingly prodigious output on the records. The creative balance of power within the group was decidedly shifting, even as the Beatles’ modus operandi stayed the same. Chafing at the creative bit, and frustrated that he simply wasn’t allowed to crack the Lennon-McCartney duopoly, Harrison grew increasingly resentful that his efforts to grow as an artist were being given short shrift.

In a sense, such a rigid response to Harrison’s rise is entirely understandable. John and Paul echoed back to him what established status quo powers have been saying to rising powers since time immemorial: “Why should we change anything, given how well things are going for us?” While that certainly was true in this case—the Lennon-McCartney bipolar world had taken the Beatles to undreamed-of creative heights—so was the fact that George Harrison, an immensely talented man in his own right, was not being given real opportunities to rise in the Beatles’ system.

The Beatles as a Frightening Metaphor for Today’s World

So let’s jump through the looking glass, taking our Beatles analogy a geopolitical step further. View John Lennon in the mid to late 1960s as a stand-in for the Europe of today: increasingly preoccupied with Yoko Ono, self-involved with the many demons of his past and present, more worried about his own personal problems and situation than about the Beatles as a whole, and eager to shed his responsibilities in the band.

See Paul McCartney as the United States, unhappily aware he is the last man standing, the force (after the death of their unsung manager Brian Epstein in August 1967) holding the group together. It fell to Paul, both by virtue of his ambitious personality and John’s lack of interest, to take over the running of the band. The others resented his increasing dominance, even as he resented the fact that they all benefited from his desire to keep the show on the road, the system ticking over. It is little wonder McCartney veered from unilateralism to isolationism in doing so. Paul is the harassed ordering power.

Imagine George Harrison as today’s rising powers (China, India, and the other emerging market powers), resentful and distrustful of the old system of dominance and eager to strike off on their own, either within a newly re-constituted group that makes room for their growth or in a new band.

And finally, conjure Ringo as the world’s smaller powers, desperate to work with everyone, to keep a stable system going, even as he is glumly aware that whatever happens will affect him far more than he can impact any outcome. Strikingly, the Beatles of the late 1960s and the global political world of today are eerily in line with one another.

By the time of Let It Be (1970), it is all over. For anyone who has watched the excruciating May 1970 film of the making of the album, the lowlight has to be when an exasperated Paul runs into a beyond-caring George, who mockingly tells him he will play whatever Paul wants, however Paul wants, all the while meaning exactly the opposite.

A Lennon-McCartney duopoly no longer makes sense to two of the three key protagonists. George Harrison no longer wants to wait for the other two to take notice of his creative flowering. John Lennon no longer wants to carry the significant burden of keeping the group together, given his other preoccupations and weariness at being the co-leader of a system he increasingly cares less and less about.

Neither of these systemic shifts happened out of the blue, and both had been commented on for several years. But nothing systematically changed to keep up with these altered creative and power realities. The world had changed. The creative power constellation within the Beatles had changed. But the power dynamic within the group had not. This is the classic definition of a failed system. Everyone knew exactly what he was referring to when Harrison named his fine first post-Beatles record All Things Must Pass.

 Using our analogy: How the West can avoid the Beatles’ fate

The first and foremost priority for the West is to accurately see the evolving power structure of the new world we live in, as the Beatles failed to do. It must not fight to uphold a unipolar or bipolar status quo that is beyond saving. To paraphrase the great Italian writer Lampedusa, if things are to stay as they are, everything must change. For the relative decline of the West and the rise of the rest is a fact, it is the undoubted historical headline of our age. This reality does not call for the resigned fatalism so popular now in Europe, but instead to adjust the power realities of global governance to the rapidly changing multipolar world we now find ourselves in.

So the West must adopt a new strategy if it is to avoid the systemic fate of the Fab Four. It must re-engage George Harrison—particularly the emerging and established democratic powers such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Japan–on new terms that actually reflect today’s changed multipolar global geopolitical and macro-economic realities. It must forge a new global democratic alliance with these rising regional powers, making them partners in defending the global status quo.

Let it be.

This article first appeared in  MarketWatch, March 28, 2018. 

Dr. John C. Hulsman is the President and Co-Founder of John C. Hulsman Enterprises (www.john-hulsman.com), a prominent global political risk consulting firm. For three years, Hulsman was the Senior Columnist for City AM, the newspaper of the city of London. Hulsman is a Life Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the pre-eminent foreign policy organisation. The author of all or part of 14 books, Hulsman has given over 1520 interviews, written over 650 articles, prepared over 1290 briefings, and delivered more than 510 speeches on foreign policy around the world. His most recent work, To Dare More Boldly; The Audacious Story of Political Risk, will be published by Princeton University Press in April 2018 and is available for order on Amazon.

 

We should worry less about Russia, and more about China

Dr. John C. Hulsman is the President and Co-Founder of John C. Hulsman Enterprises, a global political risk firm. His new book is To Dare More Boldly: The Audacious Story of Political Risk.

Before the press gets the vapours about what I am saying, here are the facts. Russia’s GDP is about the size of the state of Texas. As Dmitry Medvedev has glumly made clear, it remains a one-trick pony utterly dependent every day on the spot price of oil and natural gas, as this remains the only vibrant sector of the Russian economy.

Moscow has suffered estimated losses of around $40 billion due to the surprisingly effective sanctions enacted in the aftermath of Putin’s annexation of Crimea. Russia is thought to lose another $30 billion a year due to endemic corruption, while the collapse of the global price of energy over the past years has crippled the country to the tune of another $30 billion. Demographically, Russia is in real danger, with the population alarmingly set to shrink by ten per cent before 2050. Russia is dangerous because it is weak, not due to its strength. We do Putin a favour to make him our equal when he is so obviously not.

However, the real peril here is that the hysteria whipped up by the Salisbury case analytically obscures the true geostrategic danger out there; the rise of China as a revolutionary power that wishes to dominate East Asia and shred the norms of the western-inspired world order. While we fiddle with the Kremlin, ignoring China ensures that Rome burns.

In China, a new superpower is rising, one that is ignored by much of the British press and politicians alike because little is known of it and it is too far away to be thought of. Such a shameful lack of curiosity won’t do in our new multipolar order. Given its four decades of unprecedented economic growth, booming defence spending (now the second largest in the world) and utter disregard for international norms (it recently lost its nine-dash line arbitration South China Sea case in The Hague and nothing happened, with Beijing merely cavalierly ignoring the ruling) there is a real geostrategic danger in front of us, while we obsess about an old danger long past.

And it is not only that China’s power—unlike Russia’s—is on the rise. With Xi Jinping intent on ruling indefinitely, it is becoming painfully clear that the West has lost its strategic bet about Beijing. It was hoped that as the world accommodated China as a rising power (through agreeing to its entry into the World Trade Organisation), as China became both richer and more enmeshed in the global economic order, it would also become both more pluralist and more conservative, transforming itself into a benign (in Western eyes) status quo power, determined to defend the present western-inspired order.

That bet now appears to have been definitively lost, as despite its wondrous growth Beijing has become even more authoritarian and increasingly determined to re-write global norms, from island-building in the South China Sea through using its ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR) modern version of the Marshall Plan to economically link and then dominate much of Asia and Africa, to its bending their politics, over time, to its will.

Only China has the means, motive, and opportunity to over time threaten and supplant the present western-inspired global order. Putin makes a wonderful Bond villain but he mustn’t be allowed to obscure the geostrategic reality that dealing with revolutionary power China is the name of the game in our new era.

Published in Conservative Home, March 26, 2018. 

Everything to play for: Winston Churchill, the rise of Asia, and game changers

The ability to know when game-changing events are actually happening in real time is to see history moving. It is an invaluable commandment in the mastering of political risk analysis. To do so, an analyst must adopt an almost Olympian view, seeing beyond the immediate to make sense of what is going on now by placing it into the broader tapestry of world history itself.

The rewards for this rare but necessary ability are legion, for it allows the policy-maker or analyst to make real sense of the present, assessing the true context of what is going on presently and what is likely to happen in the future. It is jarring to compare the lacklustre abilities of today’s Western politicians—so far behind the curve in seeing the game-changing rise of Asia and the decline of the West as we enter a new multipolar age—to the phenomenal analytical abilities of earlier statesmen of vision, such as the querulous, needy, challenging, maddening, often wrongheaded but overwhelmingly talented greatest Prime Minister of England.

Churchill Rejoices over Pearl Harbor

 In the hustle and bustle of the everyday world, recognizing game-changing events can prove exceedingly difficult. Being surrounded by monumental goings on makes separating the very important from the essential almost impossible. So it was in December 1941, undoubtedly the turning point of the Second World War. During that momentous month, the Red Army turned back the Nazi invasion at the very gates of Moscow, marking the first time Hitler’s war machine had met with a real setback. But for all that the Battle of Moscow mattered enormously, it did nothing to change the overall balance of forces fighting the war, with the outcome still sitting on a knife’s edge.

But half a world away, something else did. At 7:48 AM in Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, the Imperial Navy of the Empire of Japan, attacking without warning as it had done in the earlier Russo-Japanese War, unleashed itself against the American Pacific Fleet, serenely docked at Pearl Harbor that Sunday morning. The damage was immense. All eight American battleships docked at Pearl were struck, and four of them sunk. The Japanese attack destroyed 188 US aircraft, while 2,400 were killed and 1,200 wounded. Japanese losses were negligible.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor misfired spectacularly, changing the course of the war fundamentally, drawing America into the conflict as the decisive force which altered the correlation of power around the world. Stalin, with his back still to the wall in the snows of Russia, did not immediately grasp the game-changing significance what had just happened any more than Franklin Roosevelt did, now grimly intent on surveying the wreckage of America’s Pacific Fleet and marshalling the American public for global war.

These were pressing times and it is entirely human and understandable why both Stalin and FDR had other more immediate concerns to worry about during those early December days. But Winston Churchill, the last of the Big Three, immediately latched onto the game-changing significance of what had just occurred. For the Prime Minister understood, even in the chaos of that moment, that the misguided Japanese attack has just won Britain and its allies the war and amounted to the game changer a hard-pressed London had been praying for.

In his history of World War II, Churchill wrote of that seminal day, ‘Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful.’ The great British Prime Minister slept well that night because he understood the fluidity of geopolitics, how a single event can change the overall global balance of power overnight, if one can but see.

On December 11, 1941, compounding Tokyo’s incredible blunder, Germany suicidally declared war on America. Hitler, vastly underestimating the endless productive capacity of the United States, didn’t think the declaration mattered all that much. The miscalculation was to prove his doom, as the US largely bankrolled both its Russian and British allies, supplying them with both massive loans and a limitless supply of armaments and material. Because of Pearl Harbor and Hitler’s disastrous decision, America would eventually eradicate the dark night of Nazi barbarism. Churchill was right in alone seeing the full consequences of what was going on at that pivotal time. December 1941 saved the world.

The decline of the West and the rise of Asia is the headline of our times

 In the crush of our 24-hour news cycle, it is all too easy—as it was during the stirring days of World War II—to miss the analytical forest for the trees. Confusing the interesting from the pivotal, the fascinating from the essential, remains an occupational hazard for both policy-makers and political risk analysts. But beneath the sensory overload of constant news, the headline of our own time is clear, if like Churchill we can but see.

Our age is one where the world is moving from the easy dominance of America’s unipolar moment to a multipolar world of many powers. It is characterised by the end of 500-plus years of western dominance, as Asia (especially with the rise of China and then India) is where most of the world’s future growth will come from, as well as a great deal of its future political risk. The days of International Relations being largely centred on Transatlantic Relations are well and truly at an end, as an economically sclerotic and demographically crippled Europe recedes as a power, and even the United States (still by far the most powerful country in the world) sinks into relative decline.

To understand the world of the future requires a knowledge of Asia as well as Europe, of macroeconomics as well as military strategy, of countries the West has given precious little thought to, such as China, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico, as well as the usual suspects such as a declining Russia and Europe. International Relations has become truly ‘international’ again. And that, coupled with the decline of the West and the Rise of Asia, is the undoubted headline of the age. Churchill, and all first rate analysts who understand the absolute value of perceiving game-changing events, would surely have agreed.

Dr. John C. Hulsman is the President and Co-Founder of John C. Hulsman Enterprises (www.john-hulsman.com), a prominent global political risk consulting firm. For three years, Hulsman was the Senior Columnist for City AM, the newspaper of the city of London. Hulsman is a Life Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the pre-eminent foreign policy organisation. The author of all or part of 14 books, Hulsman has given over 1520 interviews, written over 650 articles, prepared over 1290 briefings, and delivered more than 510 speeches on foreign policy around the world. His most recent work, To Dare More Boldly; The Audacious Story of Political Risk, will be published by Princeton University Press in April 2018 and is available for order on Amazon.